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Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with 
major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, 
although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these neg-
ative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD 
results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game 
theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in 
neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from 
game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these 
games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors 
in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by 
using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these 
abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further 
elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.
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introduction
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a common psychiatric disorder that is characterized by a 
 persistent and overwhelming feeling of sadness and a consistent loss of interest or pleasure in normal 
activities (1). Frequently, MDD is associated with significant and pervasive impairments in social 
functioning, defined as an individual’s ability to perform and fulfill normal social roles (2). Assuming 
that the associated negative outcomes are the result of disease rather than a functional adaption, 
understanding the mechanisms of social dysfunction is essential for preventing or ameliorating the 
associated negative outcomes. Researchers have used social cognition as a lens for investigating 
whether MDD patients can adaptively interpret the social information that is a crucial part of suc-
cessful social interaction. Using traditional paradigms, such as theory of mind (ToM) tasks and 
facial emotional processing tasks, researchers have found impairments in MDD patients’ ability to 
understand and respond to other people’s thoughts, feelings, reactions, concerns, and motives (3–5). 
However, these studies often investigated the social cognition of MDD patients using tasks that are 
in non-social-interaction contexts and may not reflect the dynamic and unique nature of real-life 
interactions with the environment, in particular the aspects of their own personal environment 
that may be troubling them. Therefore, traditional social cognition paradigms make it difficult to 
study whether MDD patients can appropriately respond to social events in dynamic and context-
appropriate ways (6).
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A game theory paradigm can provide a new tool for investigat-
ing social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders 
(7). Game theory (8) is a collection of mathematical models that 
attempt to study decision behaviors where several players must 
make choices that potentially affect the interests of other players. 
It provides a prolific source of both interactive tasks and well-
specified models for investigating social exchange. It also allows 
for complex and ecologically more valid contexts, within which 
social functioning can be examined, to be created (9). An inter-
active game theory paradigm may help to identify suboptimal 
choices and maladaptations associated with MDD and thus may 
potentially provide a powerful tool for discovering candidate 
biomarkers or endophenotypes in MDD (6).
In this article, we first briefly introduce three widely used 
games from game theory and present the major behavioral and 
neuroimaging findings in healthy populations. Factors modulat-
ing behaviors in these games, especially in the ultimatum game 
(UG), and their neural bases are also addressed. Then, we summa-
rize the major research advances obtained by using a game theory 
paradigm in studies of depressed patients and discuss the clinical 
implications of these differences between the game behaviors of 
people with MDD and those of control groups. Finally, we briefly 
discuss current challenges and potential research directions that 
may help to further elucidate the clinical use of the game theory 
paradigm in MDD.
Research Advances in Game Theory 
Studies in Healthy Populations
A set of abilities essential for behaving in accord with other people 
and for interacting with them compose our social functioning. 
Of these behaviors, strategic bargaining and reciprocal exchange 
are two social-interaction behaviors that have consequences. The 
field of economic game theory provides a set of useful, widely 
used tasks that allow the investigation of such behaviors in a 
social-interaction context (10). The UG has often been used to 
study strategic bargaining behavior, and the trust game (TG) 
and the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) have been applied to 
the study of reciprocal exchange. By establishing bargaining and 
reciprocal exchange games that are played with partners, game 
theory provides a useful foundation for the study of social func-
tioning in real, consequential social scenarios.
The Ultimatum Game
The UG (11) is often used to examine responses to fairness. In 
the UG, a proposer first makes a proposal about how to divide a 
fixed amount of money (i.e., the stake). Then the responder has to 
decide whether to accept or reject the proposal without negotia-
tion. If the responder accepts, the proposed split is realized. If he/
she rejects, neither of them receives anything (Figure 1).
In the UG, the payoff-maximizing strategy for the responder 
is to accept all non-zero offers, and for the proposer to make 
the smallest possible offer. However, contrary to this prediction, 
experiments from different countries consistently reveal that 
people do not always pursue their own maximum short-term 
profits (10). Empirically, proposers typically offer about 40% of 
the money and responders usually reject unfair offers. About 
FiGURe 1 | Schematic diagram of the ultimatum game.
50% of all unfair offers (defined as 20% or less of the stake) are 
typically rejected and rejection rates increase as offers become 
less fair (12).
To understand the mechanisms underlying the responders’ 
rejection of unfair offers in the UG, many researchers have 
investigated the neural basis of such behavior by using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The seminal work of Sanfey 
et al. (13) found that unfair offers elicited activity in brain areas 
related to emotion (anterior insula), cognition [dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (PFC)], and cognitive conflict [anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC)]. By finding a correlation between the 
anterior insula and acceptance rates, this study strengthened 
our understanding of the role of emotional processes in human 
decision-making, as indicated by the UG. Since then, a number of 
neuroimaging studies have verified or extended the findings 
of  Sanfey et  al. (13) by identifying potential neural substrates 
of unfairness and decisions to reject vs. accept an offer [e.g., 
(14, 15)]. Gabay et al. (16) and Feng et al. (17) both used meta-
analyses to summarize published fMRI articles based on the UG. 
Each of these meta-analyses revealed consistent activations in 
the anterior insula, ACC, and supplementary motor area (SMA) 
in response to unfair offers. Gabay et al. (16) also showed that 
robust activations in the ACC, SMA, right middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), and lentiform nucleus occurred when the participants 
decided to reject rather than accept UG offers. In addition, fair 
offers in the UG led to consistently stronger activations in the 
bilateral ventromedial PFC, posterior insula, the left posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus, and the right inferior 
temporal gyrus compared with the activations found in those 
areas in unfair offers (17). Accordingly, Feng et al. (17) suggested 
that two systems, a reflexive and intuitive system (System 1) and 
a reflective and deliberate system (System 2), are involved in the 
fairness-related decision-making. System 1 includes the anterior 
insula, amygdala, and ventromedial PFC, whereas System 2 
includes the dorsal ACC, ventrolateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, 
and dorsolateral PFC. The intuitive system is involved in rapidly 
FiGURe 2 | Schematic diagram of the trust game. Note: at the 
beginning, each player is endowed with equal amounts of money [e.g., (x, x)]. 
The investor can choose “non-trust” and quit the game with a small payoff for 
both players [i.e., (x, x)] or can choose “trust” to continue the game. If the 
investor chooses “trust” and invests his money, this money that the investor 
invests to the trustee is multiplied by some factor (e.g., 3). The trustee then 
can choose “reciprocate” and return some money back to the investor, giving 
them both a higher payoff [e.g., (2x, 2x)] or choose “defect” and keep the 
additional 3x for himself, resulting in an even larger payoff to the trustee and a 
payoff of 0 to the investor [e.g., (0, 4x)]. By substituting different payoff 
numbers, different incentives for cooperation can be studied.
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evaluating norm violations and the deliberate system is involved 
in integrating both self-interest and social norms to regulate the 
intuitive system to permit more flexible decision-making (17).
Behavioral studies have also shown that proposers in the UG 
usually propose fair distributions, but the psychological mecha-
nism and neural basis behind this fair behavior remain unclear. 
One solution is to compare the proposers’ fair behaviors and their 
brain activations in the UG with those in a dictator game (DG). 
The differences may provide some insights into proposers’ deci-
sions in the UG. In the DG, the proposer makes a similar type 
of split, but the responder has no choice but to accept the offer. 
As in the UG, the standard economic solution to the DG is that 
the rational and self-interested proposer would always offer the 
minimal amount of money to the responder. However, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that proposers share certain portions of 
their money (18). In the DG, the responder has no option but to 
accept the offer, so any fair behavior by the proposers in the DG 
may reflect different motivations than those in the UG. Weiland 
et al. (19) examined the brain activity that contributes to fair and 
unfair behaviors of proposers in the UG and DG with the goal of 
exploring whether egoistic and altruistic motives of the proposers 
affect fairness differently in the two games. They found that fair 
offers in the UG were related to enhanced activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), dorsolateral PFC, medial orbitofrontal 
cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and striatum, brain areas which 
are involved with reward and with the ToM. This corroborates the 
idea that egoistic motives, conjecturing the behaviors of others, 
and making acceptable offers to get self-beneficial results, includ-
ing long-term results made possible by pan-cultural systems of 
direct and indirect reciprocity, are primarily responsible for fair 
offers in the UG. However, fair offers in the DG were related 
to increased activity in the dorsal ACC and the PCC, which 
are related to cognitive conflict. This supports the idea that in 
the conflict between altruism and self-profit, altruistic motives 
primarily drive the proposer to make fair offers in the DG (19). 
Zheng and Zhu (20) also investigated the differences in neural 
activity between a proposer’s decision-making in the UG and 
the DG and further validated the findings of Weiland et al. (19). 
In addition, some researchers explored this problem from the 
perspective of norm compliance. Because of differences in the 
rules between these two games, researchers have considered that 
a proposer’s fair behavior in the DG results from voluntary norm 
compliance, whereas fair behavior in the UG has been deemed 
sanction-induced norm compliance. Ruff et al. (21) investigated 
the biological mechanisms underlying fair norm compliance in 
the DG and UG using transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS), in which neural excitability in the right lateral PFC was 
enhanced with anodal tDCS, reduced with cathodal tDCS, or 
left unaltered by a sham/placebo tDCS as a control. The results 
showed that the right lateral PFC is involved in both voluntary 
and sanction-induced norm compliance, but they affected it in 
opposite ways. Specifically, the amount of money transferred 
in the DG decreased during anodal tDCS and increased during 
cathodal tDCS, relative to the sham condition; however, the 
amount of money transferred in the UG increased during anodal 
tDCS and decreased during cathodal tDCS, relative to the sham 
condition. These results suggest that these two forms of norm 
compliance involve distinct neural circuits; in particular, the 
right lateral PFC seems to play a fundamentally different role 
in voluntary and sanction-based norm compliance. In brief, by 
comparing with the DG, researchers examined the motivations 
and neural bases of fair behavior in the UG, and this endeavor 
identified the key role of strategic motivations and of the PFC 
when proposers make fair offers.
The Trust Game
The TG has been used to study reciprocal exchanges in economic 
transactions. In the TG (22), initially an investor must decide how 
much money to invest with the trustee. If invested, the money is 
multiplied by some factor, and then the trustee has the option to 
return any proportion of the multiplied amount to the investor. 
If the trustee honors trust and sends money back, both players 
can end up with a higher monetary payoff than was originally 
obtained. However, if the trustee abuses trust and possesses all 
the money, the investor takes a loss (Figure 2). Thus, from the 
perspective of trustee, the classical TG is in some ways similar to 
the DG in that the trustee becomes a dictator once the investor 
has surrendered their money.
In the classical TG, because the investor and trustee interact 
only once, the game theory prediction is that a rational trustee 
will not honor the trust from the investor. Accordingly, the inves-
tor, realizing this, will invest nothing in the transaction. In spite 
of these theoretical predictions, empirical studies found that most 
of the investors do send some money back to the trustees, and the 
trust is reciprocated in general (22). Previous investigations of the 
TG indicate that different neural systems, such as reward, ToM, 
and social attachment systems, are critical for understanding the 
FiGURe 3 | An example of a payoff matrix in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game.
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neurobiological basis of trust and reciprocity (23–27). In one 
fMRI study, the participants played an economic TG with both 
human and computer counterparts for cash rewards (25). Within 
the group of subjects who received the highest cooperation 
scores, the prefrontal regions were more active when the subjects 
were playing with a human than when they were playing with 
a computer following a fixed and known probabilistic strategy. 
In another study, the fMRI results showed that the anterior 
MPFC was more active when participants defected than when 
they reciprocated (27). Krueger et  al. (24) explored the neural 
mechanism of trust in a non-anonymous, repeated TG. The 
results showed that two brain systems may contribute to building 
the first player’s trust. A personal “unconditional” trust system 
involving early activation of the anterior region of the rostral 
MPFC (mentalizing) is followed by a later activation of the septal 
area, a region that has been indicated to modulate various social 
behaviors. A second “conditional” trust system does not use the 
mentalizing system but use the reinforcement learning system 
(ventral tegmental area) to build trust. Krueger et  al. (23) did 
further analyses of the experiment reported in Krueger et  al. 
(24) and explored the shared and specific networks for trust and 
reciprocity. They found that trusting and reciprocating behaviors 
draw on common neural systems of mentalizing (anterior rostral 
MPFC and temporoparietal junction) and empathy (anterior 
insula). In addition, an evaluation system for prospective out-
comes (frontopolar cortex) was specifically involved in trusting 
behavior. Together, these studies provide insight into how several 
brain regions work together when individuals choose to trust 
others and, further, to reciprocate trust. In this way, they have 
extended our knowledge of the neural bases of trust and reciproc-
ity in reciprocal exchanges.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The PDG was created to study conditions necessary to the evolu-
tion of cooperation in the context of players having conflicts of 
interest, in which there would, therefore, be a temptation to defect 
or cheat rather than to cooperate. The PDG (28) confronts each of 
two players with the same options: cooperate or defect. There are 
four possible outcomes of a round: player A and player B cooper-
ate (CC), player A cooperates and player B defects (CD), player 
A defects and player B cooperates (DC), or player A and player 
B defect (DD). The payoffs for the outcomes are arranged such 
that DC > CC > DD > CD, and CC > (CD + DC)/2. Figure 3 is 
an example of a payoff matrix in the experimental design of PDG 
studies. Each block of the payoff matrix represents a different 
outcome of a social interaction.
In the PDG, the interaction between the two players deter-
mines their payoffs. The largest payoff to a player occurs when he 
or she defects and the partner cooperates, and the worst outcome 
occurs when the player cooperates while the partner defects. 
Mutual cooperation brings a modest payoff to both players, 
while mutual defection yields a lesser amount to each. The game 
theory prediction for the non-iterated PDG among strangers is 
mutual defection. However, empirical studies confirm that play-
ers exhibit more trust than expected, with mutual cooperation 
occurring approximately half of the time (28). Researchers from 
the fields of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics have begun 
to study the neural underpinnings of the PDG. In an fMRI study 
(29), reward-related regions, such as the nucleus accumbens, 
caudate nucleus, and ventromedial frontal/orbitofrontal cortex, 
were detected when the participants engaged in mutual coopera-
tion. In addition, activation in the rostral ACC increased when 
subjects chose to cooperate after their partner had cooperated 
in the previous round, corresponding to the role of the ACC in 
detecting cognitive conflict. In a follow-up fMRI study imple-
menting repeated one-shot PDGs, Rilling et al. (30) replicated 
their earlier findings and strengthened the conclusion that sub-
jects in repeated PDGs learn to cooperate by using neural-based 
reinforcement learning strategies. Subsequently, Rilling et al. (31) 
further investigated the neural responses to non-reciprocation of 
cooperation in the PDG. The results showed that unreciprocated 
cooperation was associated with greater activity in the bilateral 
anterior insula, left hippocampus, and left lingual gyrus, com-
pared with reciprocated cooperation. Functional connectivity 
between the anterior insula and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
in response to unreciprocated cooperation predicted subsequent 
defection. This study indicates that the anterior insula and the 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex may be the cause of negative feeling 
states that bias subsequent decisions against cooperation with a 
non-reciprocating partner.
Factors Modulating Game Behaviors and 
Their Neural Bases
The wealth of data produced by the game theory paradigm is of 
great interest to researchers from different fields. However, because 
many contextual factors and experimental parameters can affect 
game behavior, comparisons between studies are complicated. In 
order to have a clear understanding of the cognitive mechanisms 
of social interactions in the game theory paradigm and their 
neural bases, we must remain aware of the multiple sources of 
potential confounds. In this section, we will focus on the neural 
substrates of the factors that modulate game behaviors. The fac-
tors modulating behaviors in the UG and their neural bases have 
been investigated in numerous studies. However, few neuroim-
aging studies have addressed the underlying neural substrate of 
the factors modulating behaviors in the TG and PDG. Thus, this 
section will primarily summarize the neuroimaging studies that 
investigated factors affecting UG behavior and their neural bases 
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one by one but only briefly summarize the behavioral studies that 
explored the factors modulating behaviors in the TG and PDG.
Factors Modulating UG Behaviors and Their 
Neural Bases
In the UG, increasing evidence has shown that individuals’ social 
decisions are not only affected by the fairness of the offer itself, 
but also modulated by various social factors. Researchers have 
investigated the factors affecting UG behaviors, such as stake size, 
gain–loss contexts, gain–loss frames, group opinion, social status, 
and emotion, along with their neural bases.
Stake Size
A unique feature of human beings is a strategically contingent 
compliance with social norms even though this normative 
decision means curbing short-term self-interest. However, 
sometimes money talks. Previous behavioral studies that used 
the UG showed deviations from the fairness-related normative 
decision (rejection of unfair proposals) as a result of high mon-
etary incentives. For high stakes, responders tend to reduce the 
threshold below which they reject proposals (32–37). In order to 
investigate the neural substrates underlying this deviation, our 
group conducted an fMRI study using a revised UG in which fair-
ness and a proposed monetary amount varied orthogonally (38). 
Consistent with previous reports, we found that the rejection 
rates for unfair proposals with a high stake size were significantly 
lower than those for unfair proposals with a low stake size. This 
behavioral deviation from the normative decision was reflected in 
the participants’ brain activations. The fMRI results showed that 
the fairness-related activations of the bilateral insular cortices 
and the right lateral PFC were modulated by monetary incen-
tives. Additionally, inter-individual differences in the modula-
tion effects in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) accounted for 
inter-individual differences in the behavioral modulation effect, 
as measured by the rejection rate. This study provided neural 
evidence for the modulation of fairness by the size of a monetary 
incentive and also for inter-individual differences in the deviation 
from fairness-related normative choices.
Gain–Loss Contexts
Social behaviors in studies using the UG have been widely investi-
gated in the gain context, i.e., when players split a certain amount 
of money as their gains (11, 13, 39). However, the problem of nego-
tiating over losses, such as the liquidation of a bankrupt company, 
is as unavoidable and problematic as the problem of negotiating 
over gains. Recent studies have tried to probe the potential effect 
of gain and loss contexts on players’ decisions in the UG. In the 
loss context, the proposer and responder need to pay a sum of 
money. Acceptance by the responder will lead to the suggested 
division of the payment and rejection will result in a complete loss 
for both players. Behavioral studies have revealed that responders 
assigned lower fairness ratings and rejected more offers in the 
loss context compared with the gain context (40, 41). Researchers 
also examined the neural mechanisms underlying rejections of 
unfair losses and unfair gains in the UG. Guo et al. (42) found 
that the left dorsolateral PFC, bilateral anterior insula, ACC/
anterior middle cingulate cortex, and bilateral dorsal striatum 
were activated when comparing rejection with acceptance in 
the loss but not the gain context. Wu et al. (43) found that the 
positive correlation between fairness and activation in the ventral 
striatum was reduced, while the negative correlations between 
fairness and activation in the dorsolateral PFC were enhanced in 
the loss context. Additionally, rejection-related dorsal striatum 
activation was higher in the loss context. Together, the results 
indicated that participants may undergo more unfairness and a 
stronger desire to punish social norm violations, inducing more 
fairness-related neural activities in the loss context.
Gain–Loss Frames
The way the information is formulated, such as gain or loss, has 
been found to affect people’s risky decisions (44, 45). The way 
an offer is framed may well affect decision-making in the UG. 
Leliveld et  al. (46) manipulated giving and taking situations 
for UG proposers by putting chips on the proposer’s or the 
responder’s side of the table. They found that the chips allocated 
to the responders were highest in the taking UG and lowest 
in the giving UG. Recent studies also investigated the framing 
effect on the responder’s decision behavior by manipulating the 
instructions or the experimental design. In a psychophysiological 
study, researchers found a defense response (increased heart rate 
and skin conductance) and a higher rejection rate under the loss 
frame than under the gain frame (47). The behavioral finding of 
Wu et  al. (48) repeated the above result, and the event-related 
potentials (ERPs) (P300) were more positive in the “gain” than 
in the “loss” condition. Although Tomasino et  al. (49) did not 
find any significant effects related to gain–loss frames, neuroim-
aging data revealed an interaction of frame by response, which 
showed increased activation in the right rolandic operculum/
insular cortex and the anterior cingulate, among other regions, 
when accepting vs. rejecting in the “loss” frame, as compared to 
accepting vs. rejecting in the “gain” frame. Additionally, the left 
occipito-temporal junction was activated for “loss” vs. “gain” for 
fair offers, consistent with the observation that the same offer 
could be made unpleasant by the presence of a “loss” frame. 
These studies extended the current understanding of the neural 
substrates of UG behavior by exploring the formulations of infor-
mation processing that are sensitive to gain–loss frames.
Group Opinion
When an individual’s actions conflict with those of the group 
to which they belong, they may alter their initial behavior to 
comply with the group norm. This phenomenon is known as 
“social conformity” (50, 51). Individuals’ choices in a monetary 
game could also be modulated by their peers’ opinions. Grosskopf 
(52) used a modified UG, in which one proposer faced three 
responders. The results showed that the rejection rates in the UG 
with competitive responders were significantly lower than those 
in the traditional case. Wei et  al. (53) further investigated the 
response of responders to group opinion in the UG while meas-
uring their brain activity. In this study, after the subject made 
his/her initial choice (accept or reject an offer) in each round, 
the choices from four other peers, which could be incongruent, 
moderately incongruent, or congruent with his/her choice, were 
presented to him/her. Next, the participant was given a second 
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chance to decide how to respond to the same offer. They found 
that the participants changed their choices when these choices 
conflicted with the collective opinion of the group, especially in 
unfair treatment situations. The neuroimaging data revealed that 
incongruence with group norms activated brain regions, such as 
the insula, middle temporal gyrus, MFG, inferior parietal lobule, 
MPFC, and precuneus, that are involved in norm violations and 
behavioral adjustment. This study indicated that a strong group 
consciousness motivated individuals to adopt the opinions of 
the other group members, and then change their initial choices 
and conform to the group norm. These findings contributed to 
recent research exploring the neural mechanisms of violations of 
social norms and provided information about the neural basis of 
conformity behavior in an economic game.
Social Status
Social status, or social rank, refers to an individual’s relative 
position in terms of wealth, ability, education, stature, or profes-
sion in a hierarchy (54). As a highly pervasive principle of social 
organization found in many species (55), social hierarchy affects 
the way we see others and ourselves. Individuals with a high 
standing often have preferential access to the resources vital to 
reproduction and survival, including food, land, information, 
power, and potential mating partners; they also have more power 
or influence over individuals of lower standing (56). Therefore, 
social status may influence the way we engage in wealth alloca-
tion. Using ERPs, Hu et al. (57) investigated the ways that social 
status modulated acceptance rates and neural responses to offers 
in the UG. In this study, they used an interactive rank-inducing 
task to dynamically manipulate the participants’ social status 
over time, and then asked the participants to act as responders 
in the UG while their ERPs were simultaneously recorded. The 
behavioral results showed that the participants were less likely to 
accept unfair offers when they were endowed with a high status 
than with a low status. When the participants actually received 
unfair offers, the late positivity potential (400–700 ms) was more 
positive in the high status condition than in the low status condi-
tion, suggesting an increased arousal for unfair offers in high 
status individuals. These findings suggest a strong role of social 
status in modulating individual behavioral and neural responses 
to fairness.
Emotion
An individual’s emotion plays an important role in social 
decision-making (58). To investigate the effects of emotion on 
fairness behaviors in the UG, researchers have tried to manipulate 
individuals’ moods to study the impact of incidental moods on 
decisions. Harlé and Sanfey (59) induced two basic emotional 
states (amusement or sadness) which were compared with a 
neutral-emotion control. They found that higher sadness resulted 
in lower acceptance rates of unfair offers, whereas induced 
amusement was not associated with any significant bias in 
decision-making. Harlé (60) further investigated how such biases 
are implemented in the brain. Neuroimaging data revealed that 
unfair offers elicited brain activations related to aversive emo-
tional states and somatosensory integration (anterior insula) and 
to cognitive conflict (ACC) when in a sad emotional state. Sad 
participants also exhibited a diminished activation in the ventral 
striatum, a region associated with reward processing. In addition, 
insular activation mediated the relationship between sadness and 
decision bias, demonstrating that mood states can be integrated 
at the neural level to bias decision-making. Other researchers 
also found that emotion regulation (61, 62) and different emotion 
regulation strategies (63) can change the behavioral pattern of 
responders and their brain activations in the UG. Notably, these 
studies have provided significant information for our under-
standing of the effects of emotions on socioeconomic decisions.
In summary, researchers have investigated the factors 
modulating UG behaviors and their neural bases from a variety 
of perspectives. These endeavors have deepened our understand-
ing of game behavior in the UG and indicated that people’s fair 
behavior may be affected by many social factors. Importantly, 
however, the number of previous studies that have explored the 
impact of certain factors (such as stake size or social status) is 
relatively small and the behavioral results of some factors (such as 
the framing effect) have been inconsistent. Thus, further research 
is still needed to probe the effects of these factors on UG behavior.
Factors Modulating TG Behaviors
Researchers who use the TG have also continuously focused 
on the parameters that could potentially affect the results 
and therefore should be taken into account when designing 
such tasks. Recently, Tzieropoulos (26) reviewed the previous 
literature and clustered the factors that modulated trust when 
subjects played the role of the investor into six main factors: (1) 
The trustee. Specifically, cues about the trustee (e.g., emotion, 
ethnicity, and facial attractiveness) can have a great impact on 
the investment decision (64, 65). (2) The administration of the 
game (single-shot or repeated interactions). Multi-rounds allow 
the investor to test more parameters that can influence trust 
than do single interactions. For example, the investor can form 
an opinion about the trustee’s reputation based on the trustee’s 
responses across repeated interactions (66). Previous studies 
have shown that multi-round versions of the TG involve learn-
ing and adaptive processes that are rarely obtained during single 
interactions, although the learning effects can be diminished by 
other available information (24). (3) The impacts of hormones 
and genetics. Several behavioral studies have found that natural 
and manipulated oxytocin (OT) levels have a great influence on 
trust in the TG (67–69), and genotyping studies have indicated 
links between the OT receptor gene OXTR and trust behavior 
in the TG (70). For a detailed review on the effect of OT on TG 
behavior, see Bartz et  al. (71). (4) Inter-individual differences. 
These can also bring about significant behavioral differences 
in the TG. For example, recent experience of a traumatic 
event is considered the strongest factor associated with low 
trust, followed by belonging to minorities (including being a 
woman), being economically unsuccessful in terms of income 
and education, and living in a racially mixed community with 
a high degree of income disparity (72). (5) Time. It has been 
reported that spontaneous and rapid decisions can lead to more 
investments in the TG (73). Thus, time limitation should be 
carefully taken into consideration when designing cooperative 
games. (6) Other experimental settings. Other variations in the 
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experimental setup, such as the freedom of choices of the inves-
tor and the trustee, the multiplication of the amount, and the 
use of real money or not, may also affect behaviors. In addition, 
recently some researchers found that the gain–loss domain (74), 
reciprocity expectation (75), and feedback (76) impact investor 
behavior. All these factors have to be carefully considered when 
using cooperative games.
Compared with investors, only a very few studies have 
specifically focused on trustees. Knoch et al. (77) manipulated 
the trustee’s reputation by providing the investor a summary 
of the trustee’s previous decisions and found that trustees in 
the reputation condition returned on average 43.8% of the 
money, but just 24.9% in the anonymous condition. So far, 
only a few neuroimaging studies have addressed the underly-
ing neural substrate of the factors that modulate trust. In 
summary, the factors mentioned above remind researchers of 
how subtle changes can affect behaviors when studying social 
decision-making.
Factors Modulating PDG Behaviors
The factors modulating cooperativeness in the PDG have also 
been explored and can be clustered into five major categories: (1) 
Individual features. Shinada and Yamagishi (78) found a negative 
relationship between physical attractiveness and cooperative 
behavior among young men but not among older men or women. 
Reed et  al. (79) found that pleasant facial expressions were 
predictive of cooperative decisions within dyads; whereas con-
temptuous facial expressions were predictive of non-cooperative 
decisions within dyads. These studies indicated that ecological 
factors and individual characteristics can have a large impact on 
an individual’s decision-making in the PDG. (2) Experimental 
termination rules. Normann and Wallace (80) compared three 
different experimental termination rules in four treatments: 
a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a 
random termination rule. They found that the termination rules 
did not significantly affect average cooperation rates. However, 
the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and 
end-game behavior. Specifically, an (expected) longer length of 
the game significantly increased cooperation rates. (3) Serotonin. 
Wood et al. (81) found that serotonin plays a crucial role in coop-
erative behavior. (4) OT and social value orientation. Declerck 
et al. (82) found a joint effect in individuals with a proself social 
value orientation between OT and his/her personality trait social 
value orientation on cooperative behavior in a one-shot PDG. (5) 
Spatial population expansion. Using an experimental PDG, Van 
Dyken et  al. (83) concluded that spatial population expansion 
propels the evolution of cooperation via increasing the positive 
genetic assortment at population frontiers and via selecting for 
phenotypes that benefit the productivity of local demes. To our 
knowledge, however, no neuroimaging studies have examined 
the neural bases of the modulation of cooperativeness by these 
factors. To summarize, researchers have explored factors that 
affect game behaviors in the PDG from a number of perspec-
tives. Being aware of the multiple sources of potential confounds 
is helpful for forming strict experimental designs and therefore 
facilitates a further understanding of the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in game behaviors and their neural substrates.
Game Theory Paradigm: Research 
Applications and implications in MDD
Applications of the Game Theory Paradigm in 
MDD
Improving social and interpersonal functioning is a key compo-
nent of successful interventions for depression (84, 85). As we 
mentioned in the Section “Introduction”, one possible avenue 
for understanding social functioning in people with MDD is to 
let them accomplish tasks that involve cooperation, reciprocity, 
deception, and behavior adjustment relying on the decision 
behaviors of others. A game theory paradigm suits these require-
ments and many significant findings have been obtained for 
people with MDD.
Several studies administered the UG paradigm to MDD 
patients to explore deviations in their social-interaction behavior 
(86–91). The findings of these studies not only indicate impaired 
social decision-making in MDD, but also increase our under-
standing of the social cognition of depressives. Researchers have 
found that the altered performance in the UG by MDD patients 
can be explained from the perspective of social cognitive dys-
function, such as ToM deficits, negative cognitive schema, and 
reduced reward sensitivity. Previous studies have indicated that 
there are clear and consistent relationships between social cogni-
tion and aspects of social functioning (92, 93). Thus, investigating 
social cognition in depressives based on their performance in 
game theory paradigms can contribute to the understanding of 
social functioning in MDD.
In the game theory paradigm, the abilities associated with 
ToM play a critical role during interactions. The participants need 
to comprehend the intentions, beliefs, and wishes of others in 
social interactive tasks. Researchers have found that intact social 
cognition, especially ToM, plays an essential role in making a 
distinction between unfair proposals from computer proposers 
and human proposers in the UG (30). In one of our previous stud-
ies, we included human and computer offers in the UG and found 
aberrant decision-making behaviors in MDD patients when 
receiving unfair proposals from human and computer partners 
(91). In the human proposer condition, the participants needed 
to surmise the intentions of others, whereas in the computer pro-
poser condition they did not. However, unlike healthy controls, 
the MDD patients were unable to respond discriminatively to 
unfair proposals from computer partners and human partners. 
Thus, it is possible that dysfunction in ToM made the depressed 
patients treat the human partner and the computer partner 
indiscriminately. However, the exact role of ToM deficits in the 
abnormal performance of MDD patients during the game theory 
paradigm can better be explored by using an interactive game 
theory paradigm or other paradigms, such as a mini-UG, which 
is an adapted version of UG to disentangle inequity aversion and 
intentionality considerations (94). We believe that the use of these 
game theory paradigms is a useful complement to the traditional 
methods for studying ToM.
Negative cognitive schema is a major characteristic of patients 
with MDD. To be specific, MDD patients are more sensitive to 
negative stimuli in their environment and tend to treat neutral 
or ambiguous stimuli as negative or as less positive. This negative 
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cognitive bias has been observed in memory and attention, 
facial emotion processing, and the social and moral emotions 
of patients with MDD (95). In studies of game behavior, Gradin 
et al. (88) found that depressed patients reported decreased levels 
of happiness when facing “fair” offers in the UG in comparison 
to controls. Harlé et  al. (89) found that depressed participants 
exhibited more negative emotional reactions to unfair offers. We 
also found that MDD patients perceived fairness differently from 
normal controls in our UG study, in that they had a tendency to 
judge an offer as less fair than the normal participants did (91). 
Thus, we conjecture that the negative cognitive schema of MDD 
also exists in social interactive contexts. Consistent with this 
speculation, we found that the acceptance rates of the depressed 
patients were lower than those of the controls (91). It is possible 
that the negative cognitive schema makes MDD patients pay 
more attention to negative cues such as inequitable offers than 
to reward cues, thus causing more rejections. Although the game 
behavior of people with MDD in the UG still needs to be investi-
gated extensively, this negative schema cannot be ignored when 
predicting and explaining their behaviors.
Research has showed that depressed individuals display 
decreased reward sensitivity and that depression is associated 
with reduced activation in reward-related brain regions (96). 
In the UG, fair offers seem to activate reward-related brain 
regions, such as the striatum and the ventromedial PFC (14), 
and, accordingly, increasingly fair offers from a partner can be 
regarded as social rewards. Thus, the reward-related processing 
in people with MDD can be investigated by implementing UG 
tasks. Gradin et al. (88) investigated brain activation using fMRI 
in unmedicated, depressed participants. The results showed that, 
with an increase in offer fairness, the normal controls activated 
the nucleus accumbens and the dorsal caudate, regions that 
associate with processing social information and rewards (97). 
By contrast, the depressed participants did not activate these 
regions with increasing fairness. The participants with depression 
also exhibited a diminished response to increasingly unfair offers 
in the medial occipital lobe, a region that has been reported to 
be associated with early visual processing of social information 
(98). This study suggests that there are significant differences 
between depressed individuals and healthy controls in the neural 
substrates involved in processing social information, and reward. 
In addition, hyposensitive responses to reward appear to underlie 
a failure to maximize potential monetary earnings. In the UG, 
most studies also found that MDD patients showed statistically 
or numerically decreased acceptance rates compared with normal 
controls (86, 87, 90, 91), resulting in the subjects in the depressed 
group earning less money.
Despite these important findings about MDD, obtained by 
using the UG, it is noteworthy that the results were inconsistent, 
with studies discovering increased, unchanged, or decreased 
rejection rates to unfair proposals in depressed individuals 
(86–91). We speculate that the inconsistent findings in the UG 
behavior of patients with MDD may be due to the following 
confounding factors. The first is sample heterogeneity. In the 
study of Harlé et  al. (89), the participants were undergraduate 
students and were drug-naïve patients and 4 out of 15 subjects 
were diagnosed subthreshold MDD (89). In the other studies, the 
patients were in a clinical population and most of them were tak-
ing antidepressant drugs. The inconsistent findings also suggest 
heterogeneity in the severity of symptoms. In accordance with this 
conjecture, we found a significantly negative relationship between 
the patients’ acceptance rates and the severity of their depression 
in our study (91). In addition, the mixed findings suggest a role 
for antidepressant drugs in the ultimatum bargaining behavior of 
depressed patients. It has been found that a kind of antidepres-
sant can increase acceptance rates in healthy participants (99). 
In keeping with this, it seems likely that antidepressants should 
increase acceptance rates, but antidepressants may have a different 
influence on the brains of MDD patients compared with healthy 
participants. The effects of long-term antidepressants on the UG 
behavior of MDD patients should be investigated in the future. 
Furthermore, the task paradigms and experimental parameters 
have differed among the UG studies that involved MDD patients. 
Agay et al. (86) adopted a two-round UG paradigm (a demonstra-
tion round and a real round), but Destoop et al. (87) made the 
participants play the responder role first and then the proposer 
role with the same partner in each round. This procedure differed 
from that used in the other studies in which the participants only 
played as responders in all the rounds. Additionally, some experi-
mental parameters, such as the number of trials, the stakes, and 
the response time limit, also varied between the studies. Thus, the 
experimental design may be a potential source of confounding 
factors that contributed to the inconsistent results.
To date, only a few studies have investigated the behaviors 
of MDD patients in the TG (100–102). In the study by Zhang 
et al. (102), all the participants played as trustees. In each trial, 
the participants received a request from the investor for a certain 
amount of the expected repayment and the participants had to 
decide whether to give more (altruistic act), the same, or less 
(deceptive act) than the expected amount. The money obtained 
in the trial was confiscated if the deceptive act was caught. The 
results showed that the depressed people made both fewer altru-
istic and fewer deceptive responses than the healthy participants 
in all the conditions. Furthermore, the specific behavioral pattern 
of the MDD patients was modulated by the task factors, including 
the risk of deception detection and the other players’ intentions 
(benevolence vs. malevolence). These results reflect the tendency 
of people with depression to be self-focused (102). It may be 
difficult for depressed patients to integrate information of both 
risk and other people’s intentions into social decisions. Using 
the same experimental design, Shao et al. (101) investigated the 
neural basis of MDD patients’ reduced tendency to make low-risk 
cheating choices. They found that when comparing brain acti-
vations during low-risk cheating with those during benevolent 
choices, the MDD patients exhibited weaker activations than 
the controls in the executive networks of the dorsolateral PFC 
and in the anterior insula and dorsal putamen, which have been 
implicated in value- and risk-based instrumental behaviors. They 
also obtained limited evidence that MDD patients showed abnor-
mal IFG activity when making high-risk cheating choices. These 
findings have provided new theoretical insights into the neural 
mechanisms of risky decision-making processes in people with 
MDD in social contexts and may indicate possible functional 
deficiencies in the lateral PFC-striatal/limbic networks that are 
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critical for risk-adaptive social responses. In addition, Cáceda 
et al. (100) further examined the role of gender in the potential 
impacts of depression on TG behavior. They found that depressed 
men showed more reciprocal behavior than healthy men, whereas 
this effect was absent between depressed and healthy women. 
In addition, suicidal ideation induced a gender-specific pattern 
of self-centered behavior (not giving after receiving): suicidal 
depressed men were less self-centered whereas suicidal depressed 
women were more self-centered. This study indicated that depres-
sion, particularly suicidal ideation, is related to a reversal of the 
gender-specific patterns of reciprocal behavior, suggesting the 
possibility of aberrancy in the regulation of the sex hormones. 
It is worth noting that the above findings need more studies to 
validate the findings, and, specifically, research is needed from 
the perspective of the investor.
The game behaviors of MDD patients in the PDG were 
also investigated. Hokanson et  al. (103) used a modified PDG 
in which each player’s relative power was manipulated. The 
results indicated that the interactive pattern of depressives in the 
high-power role was relatively exploitive and non-cooperative, 
whereas depressives in the low-power role did not exhibit unique 
game behaviors. Haley and Strickland (104) found that depressed 
participants who experienced betrayal were more critical of their 
own decision on a subsequent interaction. Depressed, betrayed 
subjects also behaved more aggressively to their betraying 
partner than did non-depressed, betrayed subjects. These two 
early studies helped researchers to understand the impaired 
social-interactional approaches and cognitive schemata of 
depression. More recently, Surbey (105) investigated the rela-
tionship between depressive symptoms and cooperation as well 
as whether cognitive styles significantly influenced cooperative 
behavior. The results showed that the participants with more 
severe depressive symptom exhibited a significantly reduced 
intention to cooperate in the PDG. The hierarchical regression 
showed that individuals with heightened attributional optimism, 
or a tendency to attribute good events to more stable causes than 
negative events, cooperated more. In addition, Clark et al. (106) 
found a significantly negative correlation between an individual’s 
depressive symptoms and his/her performance in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Pulcu et al. (107) also found that symptomatic patients 
defected significantly more often in the PDG. Thus, depressive 
symptoms were associated with an inability to sustain recipro-
cal cooperation. The findings from these studies contributed to 
furthering our understanding of the specific patterns of social 
behavioral changes associated with depression.
Potential implications of the Game Theory 
Paradigm in MDD
Building from the above neuroimaging exploration into the game 
theory paradigms, researchers studying social decisions have 
focused on identifying neurocognitive processes that may have 
uniquely evolved to guide social behavior. However, which aspects 
of the choice situations or which of the specific decision-making 
stages may be involved in social decisions in MDD remains 
unclear. Analyzing the different decision-making stages in social 
interactions will open a new avenue for studies of MDD. Ruff 
and Fehr (108) proposed three classes of situations that involve 
different targets and reference frames for social decision processes. 
The first class includes all situations in which an agent assesses 
how specific other individuals and their behavior affect his or her 
own well-being. The second class concerns situations in which 
an agent’s brain evaluates choice options and outcomes vicari-
ously for others. The third class comprises situations in which an 
agent guides his or her behavior to comply with normative social 
principles. The specific choice situations were assessed for each 
of the three paradigms. In addition, the decision-making stage, 
which includes the choice of an appropriate action, an evaluation 
of the choice outcome, and learning from the outcome, was also 
assessed for each of the three paradigms and is discussed in this 
review. Researchers have reported that the decision process of the 
investor in the TG is a first class situation. Thus, an example of 
the choice, outcome, and learning stages for this situation can be 
deciding whether to invest money with someone, finding out that 
the other person defected, and learning about the other person’s 
trustworthiness (108). The UG and PDG, in which normative 
social principles concern fairness and cooperation, are examples 
of third class situations. An example of the decision stage for 
this situation could be altruistic punishment of norm violations, 
enjoying fair distributions/mutual cooperation, and changing 
the participant’s opinion to increase social conformity (108). 
Investigating the social decision-making stages of game behaviors 
in MDD patients can be expected to be helpful for understanding 
the behavioral characteristics of MDD in each stage and, further, 
for figuring out specific stages in which abnormal decision-
making behavior occurs in the patients. Furthermore, developing 
new research paradigms based on these distinct decision-making 
stages may facilitate more targeted research on depression.
The predominant current medical view is that depression is a 
mental disorder (1). Great strides have been made by researchers 
and practitioners in diagnosing, treating, and understanding 
the prognosis of MDD patients in the past 50 years. Though the 
medical model of MDD as pathological is the majority view, 
some researchers have attempted to explain it from the perspec-
tive of evolutionary adaptation, with one approach arguing that 
depression itself is an adaptation. One of the evolution-related 
models is the adaptationist social navigation hypothesis (SNH) 
for MDD (109–111), which proposes that depression plays two 
complementary roles in dealing with particularly important and 
troublesome social problems. These roles are carried out by (1) a 
social rumination function and (2) a social motivation function 
(111). Because most instances of MDD appear to be initiated by 
adversity, evolutionary theories of MDD generally propose that 
sadness and low mood evolved as beneficial responses to adversity. 
Thus, evolutionary theorists hold that the social rumination func-
tion enables people in depressive situations to focus their limited 
cognitive resources on planning ways out of complex social 
problems. The social motivation function can, in turn, induce 
close social partners to provide problem-solving help and make 
concessions for the depressed person. On the one hand, some 
findings about depressives from game theory paradigms may be 
explained by this adaptive view. For example, the finding that 
depressed subjects exhibit lower acceptance rates of unfair offers 
and thus gain less money is very much in line with the expecta-
tions of the SNH, in that it proposes that depression (related to 
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sadness) functions to resist behavior by the social network that 
tends to maintain the responder in an unfavorable (low profit) 
social niche. On the other hand, it is possible that game theory 
paradigms may be used to test predictions of the evolutionary 
adaptationist MDD hypotheses. Although evolutionary theory 
is a reasonably parsimonious account of the known facts about 
MDD, few of its predictions have been explored. In other words, 
adaptationist hypotheses have not yet been thoroughly tested. If 
the game theory paradigm can be thoughtfully implemented in 
ways that test the adaptationist hypotheses of MDD, it may reveal 
that MDD has an adaptive functional design. For example, a study 
could obtain initial measures of game behavior on subjects, then 
treat them using various interventions, including those recom-
mended by the adaptationist SNH, and finally remeasure their 
responses to the same game. If MDD is an adaptation, individually 
meaningful practical progress toward solving the target problem 
should quickly “normalize” game behavior, or at least move it in 
that direction. Though the adaptationist theory of MDD is far 
from being a mature theory, exploring this evolutionary body of 
theory could make it more complete, opening up a whole new 
view to many in the field of MDD studies.
Limitations of the Game Theory Paradigm
Game theory paradigms offer some real advantages over standard 
decision-making paradigms, not in the least that they embed 
actual, consequential, social interactions that allow investigation 
into complex processes, such as reputation, trust, equality, and 
cooperation. However, these paradigms have limitations and 
challenges that need to be addressed. First, as we have reviewed 
in the Section “Factors Modulating Game Behaviors and Their 
Neural Bases”, many contextual factors and experimental 
parameters can affect game behavior; thus, comparisons between 
studies are complicated. Second, game theory paradigms are 
relatively more complex than traditional non-social cognitive 
tasks. Therefore, the participants are vulnerable to the operation 
of the person who was conducting the experiment. But this 
effect can be lowered through standardizing the experimental 
procedures. In addition, interactions between individuals have 
often been strictly controlled in most previous studies. In other 
words, the decision-making process of the participants has been 
carried out in a closed laboratory. Most researchers believe that 
using these settings to conduct classic game theory paradigms 
is helpful for avoiding interference from irrelevant informa-
tion with the individuals’ decision-making, but this has clearly 
weakened the ecological validity of these experiments. Future 
research should try to incorporate virtual reality techniques and 
hyperscanning to resolve the conflicts between experimental 
control and ecological validity. Virtual reality technology is a 
new research tool that can replicate, simulate, and represent the 
real world through its capacity for allowing the creation and 
control of dynamic three-dimensional, ecologically valid virtual 
environments (112). Based on the characteristics of the game 
theory paradigm, researchers can create an advanced form of 
human–computer interface that allows the user to “interact” with 
and become “immersed” in a computer-generated environment 
in a seemingly natural fashion. Hyperscanning is a technique 
that allows the simultaneous recording of the brain activity of 
different subjects during a social interaction (113). Using fMRI, 
electroencephalographic (EEG), and near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIRS) devices, hyperscanning can study inter-brain correlations 
between the cerebral activities of a group of interacting subjects as 
a unique system. Such human–human interaction experimental 
designs seem quite similar to real-life social exchange and thus 
may have high ecological validity. The use of these techniques 
may give us a more comprehensive understanding of the motiva-
tion and psychological mechanisms involved in social decision-
making. Furthermore, currently although a few researchers have 
utilized game theory paradigms to study the interaction between 
close members of a group (114), most of the experiments have 
concentrated on stranger interactions. In real-life situations, peo-
ple are not really designed to interact much with total strangers in 
one-off situations. For people in real-life situations, maintaining 
and building reputation matters. Researchers should give more 
considerations to the use of close friends or family members to 
increase the ecological validity of game theory paradigms in the 
future.
Perspectives
In the present paper, we summarized the current findings for the 
healthy population and for depressed patients obtained by using 
a game theory paradigm, especially the UG. We believe that game 
theory, through its interdisciplinary approach and its particular 
combination of methods that allows the precise mapping of social 
behaviors across multiple levels of exploration, can provide a new 
tool to bridge the gap between neurobiological research and clini-
cal studies. Even more important is that these studies suggest the 
possibility that the altered game behaviors and brain activities in 
neuropsychiatric disorders could be useful biomarkers, providing 
information on the diagnosis, therapy evaluation, and prognosis 
of MDD and its subtypes, if any. But various challenges have to be 
solved to realize this potential. Some future prospects that need to 
be explored are proposed at the end of this paper.
Biological Bases of Social Dysfunction in MDD
One of the current challenges is our poor understanding of the 
biological basis of the altered decision behaviors in MDD. In this 
section, we express our opinion about ways to address this chal-
lenge in order to elucidate the underlying biological mechanisms 
of social dysfunction in MDD.
A potential direction would be to continue to explore the 
neural mechanisms underlying the altered social behaviors in 
MDD. Neuroimaging studies of game behaviors in MDD are 
still rare, and the preliminary findings need to be validated by 
a number of future studies. Neuroimaging techniques can help 
identify neural differences between depressed participants and 
controls and can further locate brain regions that may be linked 
to impairments in the social interactions of depressives. With 
the help of non-invasive brain stimulation techniques, such as 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and tDCS, the function 
of target brain regions may be understood by disrupting activity 
in the specific brain region and observing the behavioral changes. 
Previous studies applying low-frequency TMS and tDCS have 
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demonstrated that the right, but not the left, dorsolateral PFC 
plays a key role in implementing fairness-related behaviors in 
the UG (115, 116). This result illustrates the importance of TMS 
and tDCS in understanding the neural basis of human decision-
making. By combining repetitive TMS with fMRI, Baumgartner 
et al. (115) also found that a prefrontal network, the activation 
of the right dorsolateral PFC and posterior ventromedial PFC, 
and the connectivity between them, facilitates normal subjects’ 
willingness to reject unfair offers. Thus, future studies should 
pay attention to the functional interactions between the brain 
regions involved in games from the perspective of brain net-
works. This type of research is important for understanding the 
neurobiological mechanisms of complex social behaviors in both 
healthy individuals and those with MDD. Additionally, structural 
abnormalities in the brains of patients with MDD have been 
observed in the cortical and subcortical regions (for a review, 
see Ref. (117)). Future studies need to clarify and verify whether 
structural abnormalities in certain brain regions are related to the 
altered game behavior of people with MDD.
Another direction would be to explore the physiological 
mechanisms for the altered game behavior observed in MDD 
from the perspective of neurotransmitters. Serotonin deficiency 
has been found in MDD patients (118, 119). Recent studies con-
firmed that serotonin plays an important role in game behaviors 
(99, 120–122). Healthy participants rejected more unfair offers 
in the UG after their serotonin levels were lowered using acute 
tryptophan depletion and accepted more unfair offers after 
their serotonin levels were enhanced with citalopram (99, 120). 
Another study found that individuals with a low level of serotonin 
transport in the dorsal raphe nucleus were more likely to be intol-
erant of unfair offers, and thus more likely to engage in rejecting 
unfair offers (122). In addition, neurotransmitters, such as seroto-
nin and OT, are also closely correlated with modulations in game 
behavior in the TG and PDG in healthy populations (71, 81, 82). 
However, it is not clear whether the changes in neurotransmitters 
observed in MDD play a critical role in the patients’ abnormal 
game behavior. Thus, investigating the function of neurotrans-
mitters in game behaviors can be beneficial for illuminating the 
physiological mechanisms underlying the altered game behaviors 
observed in MDD.
Furthermore, exploring the genetic basis is another avenue for 
advancing our understanding of the social dysfunction identified 
by using a game theory paradigm with MDD patients. Cesarini 
et al. (123) summarized the findings from a research study of the 
heritability of behavior in some widely used economic games, 
including the UG and TG. The results suggested that 42% of the 
variation in the subjects’ rejection behaviors in the UG can be 
explained by genetic effects (124). In addition, the heritability 
of trust is estimated to be 20% in Sweden and 10% in the U.S 
and the heritability of trustworthiness is estimated to be 18% 
in Sweden and 17% in the U.S (125). These results suggest that 
humans are endowed with genetic variations that influence the 
decisions in game theory tasks in healthy populations. MDD has 
been demonstrated to be heritable (126, 127). However, due to a 
lack of twin and family studies that focus on social functioning, 
it is unclear whether the altered game behavior in MDD patients 
is also influenced by abnormalities in their genetic composition. 
Increased use of genetic techniques is needed to clearly elucidate 
how genes, the brain, and the disorder interplay.
Trait-State Distinction for Social Dysfunction in 
MDD
Despite the current knowledge about the applications of the 
game theory paradigm in MDD, it remains unclear whether this 
social dysfunction represents a mutable, temporary state or a 
relatively stable trait marker. All of the current studies examining 
game behavior are cross-sectional studies, which only compared 
the decision behaviors in MDD patients with those in healthy 
controls. Additional studies that investigate the game behavior 
in MDD from a variety of perspectives are urgently needed to 
address this issue more clearly. For example, longitudinal studies, 
which can help track the trajectory of disorders; studies of treat-
ment effects, which can promote our understandings of implica-
tions of the pharmacology and pathophysiology of MDD; studies 
using drug-naïve patients, which can distinguish the effects of 
medication on social behaviors from the effects of the disease 
per  se; and studies recruiting relatives who are at a higher risk 
of developing a depressive disorder, which can provide valuable 
insight on “trait” characteristics of the disorder, will be essential 
for further advancing our understanding of these diseases and 
identifying trait-state distinctions for future clinical use. Only 
by a systematic exploration using extensive research can we con-
clude that an altered game behavior might serve as a prodromal 
predictor of susceptibility to MDD.
Specificity of Game Behavior in MDD
Applications of a game theory paradigm in other mental disor-
ders have also found impaired game behaviors in populations, 
such as schizophrenia, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. In order 
to apply a game theory paradigm to clinical use with MDD 
patients, the specific characteristics of the game behavior must be 
distinguishable between MDD and other disorders. A number of 
studies of game behaviors in MDD have been summarized in this 
paper. A brief outline of the major findings from a game theory 
paradigm in other mental disorders follows. (1) Schizophrenia. 
Recently, several researchers have done studies using schizo-
phrenic patients playing the UG (86, 128–130). As proposers, 
these patients made more hyper-fair offers, the same rate of fair 
offers, and many fewer unfair offers compared with the controls 
(86). Similarly, using a sample of students, the participants who 
had higher schizotypal scores tended to offer more money (129). 
As responders, schizophrenic patients accepted a greater propor-
tion of unfair offers and had lower rates of rejection of fair offers 
(128). Yet, the rejection rate increased as the offers became less 
fair, just as in healthy populations (130). The sample of students 
with high schizotypal scores presented the same behavioral pat-
tern (129). In summary, these results show that schizophrenic 
patients had aberrant behavior by proposing more fair offers 
and accepting more unfair offers. (2) Anxiety disorder. Patients 
with MDD often display symptoms of anxiety. Previous studies 
also found that patients with an anxiety disorder showed altered 
game behavior in game theory tasks. Anxious patients accepted 
significantly more unfair offers than normal controls in the UG 
(131). Another study found that participants with a high level of 
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trait anxiety rejected more computer-proposed inequitable offers 
than did those with a low level of trait anxiety. Moreover, the 
skin conductance response to inequitable offers was correlated 
with the level of anxiety in the high level of trait anxiety group, 
but not in the low level of trait anxiety group (132). A follow-up 
ERP study revealed that the high-anxiety group showed a larger 
feedback-related negativity when facing unequal offers than equal 
ones, and a larger P300 when facing offers from a human than 
from a computer, but these effects were absent in the low-anxiety 
group (133). In brief, people differ in their levels of anxiety, and 
patients with anxiety disorders showed distinctive behavior pat-
terns during social decision-making. (3) Bipolar disorder. It is 
a severe condition typically characterized by manic and depres-
sive episodes. Duek et  al. (134) examined the UG behavior in 
patients with bipolar disorders who were currently euthymic 
(specifically, they had not been either depressed or manic for at 
least 1  month) and found that these patients rejected more of 
the moderately unfair offers than did healthy controls, a finding 
which was similar to those in MDD patients (90, 91). Future 
studies are needed to determine the similarity and differences 
between the behavioral characteristics of MDD patients from 
those in patients with bipolar disorders in game theory tasks. 
We believe that the best way to determine the specificity of game 
behavior in MDD patients may be by using neuroimaging paired 
with game-theoretic probes.
In summary, MDD patients have problems and difficulties 
with their interactions with others and their integration into 
society. Despite an increasing interest in research into social 
cognition in MDD, most research carried out in this realm has 
used non-interactive tasks, which do not capture the dynamic 
and unique nature of the social interactive processes. Utilizing an 
interactive game theory paradigm will allow us to develop clinical 
applications that are oriented to measuring and improving social 
functioning and thus provide a powerful tool for investigating 
social-interaction impairments in MDD. The research examining 
altered game behaviors and brain activities in MDD may be able 
to provide cues for identifying potential biomarkers for the diag-
nosis, therapy evaluation, and prognosis of MDD. To achieve this, 
more effort is needed to clearly elucidate the neural, physiological, 
and genetic bases of social dysfunction in MDD. Furthermore, 
the trait-state distinction for social dysfunction in MDD needs 
to be determined, and the specificity of game behavior in MDD 
also needs to be clarified.
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